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Comparing nuclear trajectories in Germany and the United Kingdom: from 
regimes to democracies in sociotechnical transitions and discontinuities  
 
Abstract  
This paper focuses on the starkly differing nuclear policies of Germany and the UK. Germany has committed to 
discontinue nuclear power, aiming to phase the technology out by 2022. The UK has long professed the aim of 
a ‘nuclear renaissance’, promoting the most ambitious nuclear construction programme in Europe. The present 
analysis of this contrast is based around a simple yet fundamental question: which aspects contribute most to 
producing such divergent energy developments in these two countries? Distinguishing possible interpretive 
dimensions that are relatively ‘internal’ or ‘external’ to the main foci of attention in sociotechnical transitions 
theory, we develop a novel set of criteria spanning technical, economic, resource-based and political issues. 
Under each, we ask whether specific characteristics of either national setting would tend to make the phase out 
of nuclear power more or less likely. Our findings are that ‘internal’ aspects tend to predict discontinuity to be 
more likely in the UK than Germany. Only ‘external’ aspects clearly predict the actual trend. We argue on this 
basis that sociotechnical discontinuity is rather poorly explained by reference to the circumscribed concepts 
highlighted in conventional narrow versions of transitions theory. What is evidently more important, are wider 




This paper is based around a simple yet under-explored query in research on Sustainability Transitions (ST) and 
socio-technical change: why do countries that are fairly similar in terms of development, wealth, size and existing 
energy portfolios, undertake such different pathways towards energy sustainability? This paper explores this 
question by examining perhaps the most starkly differing directions for ‘sustainable’ energy strategies in the 
‘developed’ world: Germany and the UK. Following the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 Germany confirmed 
a complex shift towards a decentralised low carbon energy system involving the phasing out of nuclear power 
by 2022 (1). This is an ongoing commitment, rather than a realised end. But it is precisely in this role as a firmly 
committed strategy, that the contrast is most pronounced with the contrasting commitment in the UK, 
concerning equally as-yet-unrealised plans to undertake a low carbon energy transition involving the most 
ambitious nuclear new build programme in Europe (2,3). These differing decisions have been reinforced since 
the immediate post-Fukushima decisions: with Germany on schedule in its reactor shut down plans (4) and the 
UK government sustaining policy support for new nuclear (5,6). This is despite costs of UK low carbon 
alternatives like offshore wind now being substantially below those of nuclear power (7–9). 
With the Fukushima disaster in Japan constituting (in the language of sociotechnical transitions) an external 
landscape “shock” (10), the starting point here lies beneath the detailed particularities of recent nuclear 
developments in Germany and the UK. Instead, the focus is on the strikingly different nuclear policy responses 
to this same general shock, set in the same global context, across each of these two countries (11). With a pre-
Fukushima nuclear portfolio of 17 reactors producing a quarter of domestic electricity, Germany made a decision 
to close of 8 reactors immediately and undertake a complete nuclear phase-out by 2022 (1). With 17 generally 
smaller reactors comprising only 18% of a smaller national electricity system, the UK reaffirmed its pre-
Fukushima commitment to construct around 16 GWe of new nuclear capacity by 2030, with potential for a total 
of 19 GWe after that (12). This paper asks what it is that drives such differing energy pathways.  
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There is much discussion over the particular course of events in these two countries following the Fukushima 
disaster, which might help illuminate why such different policy orientations emerged (13–15). For example, the 
timing of regional elections in Germany may have been a proximate motivating factor – with Angela Merkel 
vulnerable to losing votes if she did not reaffirm a prior nuclear phase out (13). A divergent salient factor in the 
UK, lies in close collaboration in the Fukushima aftermath between policy makers and industry to maintain a 
positive spin around nuclear (16). Rather than selecting specific explanatory storylines however, we are 
interested in more systematic interrogation of these contrasting post-Fukushima decisions, grounded in a 
broader long-run picture of trends and pressures across a range of economic, political, and technical issues.   
For a start, this requires going beyond the ‘political pyrolysis’ of reducing multidimensional political issues to an 
ostensibly simple singular technical focus disproportionately on carbon (17). Ambitions towards radical carbon 
emissions reductions both in Germany (1,18) and the UK (19) help foster this frequent over-reduction in much 
contemporary energy policy analysis (20). But it implies no diminishing of zero carbon energy imperatives, to 
acknowledge that success or failure in such a massive, complex, systemic long-term political-economic-cultural 
endeavour, should not be reduced merely to month-by-month emissions statistics. In any case, similar national 
commitments in the two countries, mean differing approaches cannot simply be explained in terms of 
contrasting intensities in stated low carbon policy goals. Scrutiny must be political not just technical, attending 
to ambiguous and contested diversities of pathways towards sustainability (21).  
To understand possible drivers, we build on a wide body of research concerned with: (1) ‘sectoral innovation 
systems’ (22,23), burgeoning analyses of ‘sustainability transitions’ (24) and the particular approach known as 
socio-technical regime theory (25,26)(27). By reference to these literatures, we develop a set of 9 criteria 
constituted by 29 parameters reflecting aspects that might variously be considered ‘internal’ or ‘external’ to the 
focal attention of these theories. We also draw on  important insights from literatures specifically on nuclear 
power (28–33), to produce from empirical analysis, a series of propostions in relation to each criterion 
concerning (to the extent possible) whether discontinuation thereby appears more likely in the UK or Germany.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce key literatures offering a basis for the present 
analytical framework. The main part of the paper is Section 3, where we discuss the evidence in each case study 
country bearing on whether nuclear discontinuation might reasonably be thought more or less likely under each 
parameter. In Section 4 we discuss the general implications that arise from these analyses. In short, what we 
find is that for ‘internal’ aspects (relating to economic conditions, strength of respective nuclear industries and 
resource potentials for rival ‘niche’ technologies), nuclear discontinuation seems clearly more likely in the UK 
than Germany. This is the opposite of the actual picture. Evidently more salient are aspects that are relatively 
external to these theories, relating to wider institutionl structures beyond the focal regime and contending 
niches, like political cultures, non-energy policy related interests and the general qualities of ‘democracy’. It is 
these that make nuclear discontinuation  more likely in Germany than the UK.  Indeed, it seems these ‘external’ 
aspects have overridden the outcome that would otherwise have been made more likely by the ‘internal’ aspects 
conventionally highlighted in sociotechnical transitions theory.  
 
2. Background literature and analytical approach 
As already discussed, this analysis builds on research relating to ‘sectoral innovation systems’ (22), ‘sustainability 
transitions’ (24) and what might broadly be understood as socio-technical regime theory (25). Taken together, 
it is this broad literature that forms the main foundations in current policy-relevant understandings concerning 
the bringing about of ‘regime shifts’ in technological systems (34). It is widely recognised here that Germany’s 
aims to move from a centralised energy system including nuclear power to a decentralised renewables-based 
system represents an example of a ‘regime shift’ (35). UK policy contrasts here, in supporting greater ‘energy 
regime’ continuity, including sustained commitment to centralised nuclear plant (36).   
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Central to such ‘regime-theoretic’ approaches are ideas that technological change entails co-evolutionary 
interactions between technological artefacts, governance institutions, and social agents. Over time, innovative 
‘niche’ technologies diffuse, transform and stabilise around what might be termed (despite various vocabularies) 
‘the regime’ (34). Through this process, new regimes arise, with differing sets of artefacts, rules and regulations 
becoming apparent (37). Much has been written on how processes of nurturing and empowerment can – 
alongside relevant contextual features of ‘the landscape’ (27) – support ‘diffusion’ of niches to ‘destabilise’ 
existing socio-technical regimes (34,38–40).  
Interest has increasingly focused at this ‘regime level’ in order to understand how ‘stability’ is in these terms 
variously maintained or undermined (36,37,41–47). It is thereby processes operating around this immediate 
explanatory context that form the ‘primary’ focus in much sociotechnical transitions analysis. We refer to this 
focal context as the ‘focal regime/niche configuration’. Aspects generally highlighted in this context are 
effectively ‘internal’ to prevailing regime theory (27). Below, we develop five criteria in this regard, relating to 
various economic, technical, engineering and innovation -related aspects conditioning relevant dynamics in and 
around a focal regime and its associated niches. 
A number of distinct concepts have been developed in order to understand the ways in which transformation is 
inhibited in socio-technical systems – and incumbency is maintained in regimes (48). These include ‘autonomy’ 
(28), ‘lock in’ (49), ‘path dependency’ (50) ‘entrapment’ (51), and ‘obduracy’ in ‘socio-technical imaginaries’ (52). 
More recently, notions of ‘incumbent strategies’ have been developed, adopting political-economic perspectives 
to analyse the ‘resistance’ of incumbents to the diffusion of alternative technologies (36,53). Similarly, recent 
attention has turned towards understanding how such path dependent configurations can be ‘destabilised’ (43) 
and well-established socio-technical systems become subject to active discontinuation (54,55). 
Discontinuation involves overcoming both relatively emergent ‘path-dependency’ and more agency-driven 
‘entrenchment’ at the regime level (56–58)(48). As Geels et al (58: 552) illustrate, incumbency-reinforcing ‘lock-
in’ mechanisms include various forms of ‘increasing return’, ‘learning by doing’, ‘scale economics’, ‘favourable 
regulations’, ‘sunk investments’ and ‘vested interests’. Likewise, contrastingly-classified similar aspects can 
contribute to the ‘lock-out’ of alternative technologies (60). From an economic perspective it follows that the 
greater the levels of: industrial strength; sunk capital; research and development expenditure; alignment in 
policy networks; and economic efficiency in the focal sector; the greater the tendencies towards path-
dependency and entrenchment (ibid).  
It is these factors that form core drivers in relation to the five broad criteria referred to here as being ‘internal’ 
to the ‘focal regime/niche configuration’ around nuclear power itself and the renewable technologies that are 
most challenging to this in UK and German low carbon energy strategies. Indeed, it is these factors that are seen 
as being especially relevant to nuclear politics, where processes of path-dependency and entrenchment are 
recognised to be intensified by engineering, scientific and regulatory consequences of the complexity, capital 
intensity and lasting nature of these projects (49,51,61). Although the technical, operational, social and 
environmental characteristics of different renewable technologies are highly disparate, they may nonetheless 
be meaningfully compared with nuclear power in these terms. And it is the priority attached to declared low 
carbon aims both in the UK and Germany that justifies the exclusion of fossil fuel alternatives in this analysis, as 
well as making it essential equally to extend analysis in principle to all potentially relevant renewable 
technologies, rather than simply picking the most obviously prominent.  
By contrast with these factors, relevant literatures suggest a different set of issues as relatively ‘external’ to the 
focal regime/niche configuration as defined here. These broader institutional conditions do not relate only to 
the immediate contexts of the focal regime, its challenger niches and most directly-linked features of broader 
landscapes. They also pervade the entire social, cultural and political milieu in the respective national settings 
4 
 
(48). Here, attention expands from the relatively tight positive focus of evolutionary economics underlying 
transition research, to the broader interpretive scope of science and technology studies. For instance, STS 
analysis of ‘socio-technical imaginaries’ (52,62) and ‘civic epistemologies’ (63) illuminates potentially formative 
processes on a wider canvas encompassing entire polities of individual countries like the UK or Germany. 
Considerations include general relationships between styles of scientific knowledge production and 
representation and distinctive constituting dynamics around the state (64). Attention addresses how recurrent 
patterns in policy-making and technological cultures can reflect more messily complex and politically, culturally 
and discursively distributed relations and processes, that defy the neatly discrete and singular visions of 
‘alignment’ underlying conventional notions of particular ‘regimes’ (48).  
Perhaps most crucially, these wider and deeper issues address the general character of the institutions, practices 
and discourses that are variously held to constitute different instantiations of ‘democracy’. Some emerging 
studies in regime theory are beginning to address related contextual geographical factors (65,66), policy 
paradigms (67), historical institutionalism (68), state politics (69,70), and the role of political struggle (71–74). 
But these pervasive characteristics of political systems taken as a whole have hitherto received relatively limited 
attention in study of sustainability transitions (75–77).  Especially neglected in this compartmentalised analysis, 
are the implications at the most general level of variously-definable ‘qualities of democracy’ taken as a whole 
(78). It is these aspects that are collectively addressed in the ‘external’ criteria (7-9) examined here.   
To include holistic consideration of general qualities of democracy may be relatively novel for transition studies, 
but it chimes with longstanding literatures specifically on the politics of nuclear power. In recent years, research 
on nuclear issues has tended to become more circumscribed around a narrow policy focus on climate change, 
energy security and economics (79,80). The correspondingly relatively limited role for social science leaves a 
tendency to neglect wider issues around the democratic implications of nuclear development, that once formed 
a key focus of interest in nuclear politics (28,31,33,81–86). So the present analysis attends to these literatures 
as well as more contemporary contributions pertinent to nuclear implications beyond climate change, energy 
security, and economics. Indeed, it is these broader technical, economic, political and cultural aspects that are 
highlighted in the present criteria.  
For example, Verbruggen et al (87) assess what they refer to as the ‘actual’ sustainability of nuclear power using 
a set of 19 criteria extending beyond the usual preoccupation with carbon alone. Based around four categories 
(including environmental/ecological, economics, social, and governance/policy), these include concerns such as 
the wider economic framework required by nuclear power to survive in current liberalised energy markets 
(88,89). Similar broad criteria are suggested in Hultman’s (90) focus on the social, political and economic aspects 
influencing nuclear development, as well as the importance of military-related activities to nuclear 
infrastructures. These interdependencies between civil nuclear and military-related nuclear activities were also 
previously a key focus (91–93), but remain largely unaddressed in contemporary research concerning the 
‘nuclear renaissance’. Indeed, military industrial dynamics are virtually never considered in the normally 
exclusive energy policy focus of sociotechnical transitions studies of ‘nuclear regimes’. Again, it is a distinctive 
feature of this analysis, that this military aspect is specifically included as an ‘external’ criterion.  
Since initial publication of the present research (94), some broader comparative analyses have emerged under a 
sociotechnical perspective of the nuclear role in energy transitions (95,96). In comparing German and Japanese 
electricity systems, for instance, Cherp et al very usefully highlight the importance of the relative strengths of 
nuclear and renewable industries and resource endowments. Crucially, Cherp et al highlight that “the strength 
of the regime affects its ability to shape state policies in its own favour” (95, p. 623). In our criteria 3 and 4, we 
also look closely at the relative favourability of industrial and resource conditions in Germany and the UK. In the 
present analysis, however, these important aspects are decomposed into a number of separable parameters, 
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and distinctively added to consideration of a wider range of potentially key further specificities in the two 
countries, including military cultures and qualities of democracy.  
Also following the present author’s focus on multiple comparative criteria for examining nuclear and renewable 
dynamics in Germany and the UK 1, another article by Geels et al uses this same cross-national comparison to 
extend a ‘multi-level’ form of sociotechnical regime theory (96). Unlike the detailed analysis undertaken here 
and by Cherp et al  (95), however, the comparative strength of national nuclear and renewable industries and 
resource potentials are not discussed by Geels et al. Suggestions are made for further complex additions to the 
favoured framework. But rather than systematically testing the applicability of the resulting new version, Geels 
et al focus primarily on fitting this to an interpretive account of various processes as these are described to 
unfold in the two countries over time. Specific parameters are not distinguished and examined for their relative 
consistency or tension with prior theoretical predictions. No attention is given, to whether or to what extent 
contrasting pictures might be suggested by considerations that are relatively ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to the 
prescribed approach. By simply asserting a new and more elaborate form of the same framework, an impression 
is given of potentially all-encompassing unfalsifiability (48). 
Assembled from a mix of literatures related to socio-technical regimes as well as nuclear specific studies, the 
present array of economic, technical, political, and social criteria, by contrast, enables a systematic test of the 
validity of prior theory. Each criterion developed here addresses considerations raised in at least some particular 
analyses of nuclear power of a kind that might reasonably be expected, in principle, to be recognised to hold at 
least some significance under some conditions, bearing on prospects for nuclear discontinuation and 
substitution by alternative energy strategies. Despite scope for ambiguity, divergent interpretations and 
disagreement the array of criteria taken as a whole arguably constitutes a reasonable set of considerations that 
might be recognised under any interdisciplinary perspective, to offer the most significant prior explanatory value 
towards understanding the comparative fortunes of nuclear power in different settings.  
 
We developed these criteria through a saturation process, attempting broadly to reflect the wide literatures 
mentioned above. The breath of these criteria limits depth in certain respects – for instance relating to: historical 
narratives, social movement complexities, discursive struggles, and ways in which qualities of democracy change 
over time. Elsewhere we have outlined in more detail factors such as the evolution of policy developments 
related to renewable developments in Germany and the UK (98 P.44) and discussions of detailed evolution of 
German and UK nuclear and renewable policies have been covered elsewhere (97–100). In this paper, we focus 
on data that illuminate broad signals under each criterion. Associated parameters do not yield in-depth narrative 
explanations but are extensive and clear enough for workable ceteris parabus propositions.  
The table below outlines each criterion, identifying in each case: whether it is ‘internal’ or ‘external’; its 
motivating rationale; and a selection of key relevant sources.  
 
Table 1: Criteria, associated parameters and selection rationale. 
 
                                                          
1 Then close colleagues in SPRU and the Sussex-led nuclear strand of the DiscGo project, Geels and Kern took 
part in a number of conversations and seminars on the current analysis by the present authors, in the lead up 








3: Empirical Discussion of Case Studies 
 
This section outlines empirical findings obtained under the framework detailed above. For each criterion, a 
number of specific parameters are discussed that might reasonably be held to bear on the likelihood of nuclear 
discontinuation. Based on this, each criterion ends with a ‘ceteris paribus proposition’ concerning whether – 
with all else being notionally equal – nuclear discontinuation might in these terms reasonably be judged to be 
more or less likely in Germany or in the UK (or to be indeterminate). The evidence for this discussion is drawn 
from the literatures considered above on socio-technical change as well as in nuclear specific literatures as 
detailed in Table 1. 
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3.1 General Energy Market Conditions  
3.1.1 Market coordination  
Germany is a paradigmatic example of a ‘coordinated economy’ with relatively strong state intervention in policy 
(101–104).  The UK, by contrast, is a ‘liberal-market economy’ displaying generally less state intervention and 
coordination (105–107). Accordingly, the UK privatised the energy industry eight years before Germany (108) 
and broadly followed a more “pro-market energy paradigm” since 1989 (109). Rapid UK electricity privatisation 
caused considerable problems for nuclear, not least the 2002 bankruptcy of British Energy (110). Also crucial to 
this parameter is the clear documentation of closer alignment and planning between publically-owned financial 
institutions and industry in Germany (111–113). Given well-documented problems around financing of nuclear 
projects (114–116) and the long time-horizons and high levels of historically-necessary public investment (117–
121), Germany’s general market and financing culture are thus clearly more suited to this technology than the 
liberalised market-based approach of the UK.  
Of course, questions might also arise as to whether a greater degree of market coordination might also be an 
advantage for renewable energy (96). Whilst dependent on government policy initiatives, however, it is 
significant that German renewable developments have been significantly more diverse and less dependent on 
state institutions and their major corporate partners than is nuclear power (35,122). Also given the greater 
proportional scale of the nuclear industry in Germany (section 3.2), the main expectation under this parameter 
would therefore most reasonably remain that stronger levels of market coordination in Germany would (all else 
being equal and on balance) tend more likely to favour nuclear power (123). 
3.1.2 Relative scale of public sector 
In 2011, public expenditure accounted for 44% of German GDP, in 2000 this figure was 47% (124). In the UK, 
public expenditure accounted for 39% of GDP in 2010 and 37% in 2000 (ibid). This might be considered an 
internal parameter because the scale of public spending provides a useful signal regarding political economic 
characteristics of the German energy sector – it is recognised that state investment has since the 1980s generally 
played a more important role in the German than the UK energy sector (105). Indeed, the German economy 
being more weighted than the UK towards the public sector has been observed to hold important ramifications 
for the respective strengths of the German and UK nuclear industries (110,125). As the IEA point out, “…access 
to direct or indirect government financing also continues to be an important factor for nuclear investments” (124, 
p.154).  
 
3.1.3 Grid Characteristics 
Both Germany and the UK traditionally relied on centralised electricity grids dominated by large power stations 
(96) so there seems no obvious infrastructure rationale why the phasing out of nuclear and deployment of 
renewables would better suit the historic circumstances of the German than the UK grid.  However, another 
relevant factor here might concern interconnection. That the continental location of the German grid makes it 
more internationally interconnected than the island-based grid of Great Britain, might make the management 
of intermittency easier (126). If so, this would only become an issue at higher penetrations than are relevant for 
our period, thus impinging more on planning, than on operations. Either way, with European electricity exports 
dominated by the nuclear system of France, greater interconnectivity might just as readily be seen as an 
advantage for the German nuclear industry. Added to this, greater infrastructure and contractual connections 
might also on balance be held to make it more difficult for one party to make a distinctive move not also followed 
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by its partners, as has been the case with the German Energiewende. In the case of the UK, on the other hand, 
concerns around the relative dearth of interconnection may indeed have contributed towards calls for new 
generation capacity. But with renewable capacity available at lower cost, it is not clear why this should 
automatically favour nuclear capacity. With interconnections set to double by the early 2020s with no noticeable 
attenuating effect on nuclear ambitions, the difference in this respect between the two countries is diminishing 
(127).  
3.1.4 Economic structure and energy use 
It is also important to consider energy users in the wider economy in Germany and the UK and how they may 
impinge on nuclear trajectories. According to World Bank data, the manufacturing share of GDP is 21% in 
Germany and only 9% in the UK (128). This pattern is especially pronounced in respect of some of the most 
energy-intense sectors – with the German steel, chemicals and automotive industries especially more developed 
than those of the UK (107). It is notable that it is energy intensive industrial interests that have often most 
strongly lobbied for ‘firm’ power sources including nuclear (129) and raised greatest concerns over the effects 
of renewables on electricity prices (129,130).  
3.1.5 Ceteris paribus proposition 
Given that the large scale and high capital intensity of nuclear power demand strong state involvement, higher 
German levels of public spending and state intervention in markets seem in principle to be more favourable to 
nuclear continuation in this country than in the UK. That German industry is more energy intense compounds 
this. There is little about grid interconnectdeness that would reverse this picture. So – all else being equal – a 
criterion of energy market conditions might most reasonably be thought to make nuclear discontinuation less 
likely in Germany than the UK. 
 
3.2:  Degree of penetration of nuclear in the electricity generating mix  
3.2.1: Overall magnitude of the nuclear generating industry 
Figure 1a (below) shows that in 2009 before Fukushima, Germany generated more than twice the absolute 
amount of electricity from nuclear power than was produced in the UK (Fig. 1a). Figure 1b shows a similar 
situation persisted after Fukushima in 2013, with Germany still producing significantly more nuclear electricity 
than the UK, ranking seventh in the world for total nuclear generation, compared with the UK at ninth. This is 
despite the stronger negative reaction to this nuclear accident in Germany compared with the UK, with 8 
reactors having been closed immediately after Fukushima. Table 2 shows the same picture to have prevailed 





Source: IAEA (131), Nuclear Energy Institute (134) 
Table 2: Scale of German and UK nuclear power industries  
 
 







Figure 2 (below) provides further historical context, showing that the German industry was persistently 
significantly larger than that of the UK over the period prior to the 2011 post-Fukushima intensification of the 




    Source: IEA (132) 
 
3.2.2: Relative dependency on nuclear power 
A measurement enabling easier comparison between nuclear dependencies in Germany and the UK is the 
relative importance of nuclear in the supply mix. Table 3 and Figure 3 (below) confirm that throughout most of 
the period considered here, the larger German electricity system has consistently been more dependent on 
nuclear power than has that of the UK.  
 
Table 3: Indicators of nuclear penetration in the UK and Germany 
 
Source:  IEA (132) World Nuclear Association (133) 
Figure 3: Percentage share of nuclear power in generation mix 
 
Source: IEA (132) 
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3.2.3: Ceteris paribus proposition 
It is clear both in relative and absolute scale, that the German nuclear industry has long been significantly larger 
than that of the UK. To the extent that this simple magnitude might be held to relate to a greater degree of ‘lock-
in’, it might reasonably be inferred – all else being equal – that Germany would face greater challenges than the 
UK in seeking to phase nuclear out.  
 
3.3: The relative strengths of the nuclear engineering sector 2  
3.3.1: Performance of plants  
The most important general measure of performance in the nuclear generating industry is load factor, referring 
to actual output as a fraction of total possible output. In these terms, the 13 highest performing nuclear power 
plants worldwide are sited in only 3 countries: 6 in South Korea, 5 in Germany, and 2 in Finland (118). German 
reactors hold the first eight positions in Nuclear Engineering International's league table of the reactors that 
have generated the most electricity to date (135). Load factor is an important proxy for manufacturing and 
equipment quality, because it is dependent to a large extent on system engineering. So it is relevant in this 
regard, that, the top three lifetime electricity generators (TWh) at the end of 2011 were all in Germany – 
Grafenrheinfeld, Grohnde, and Philippsburg 2 (136). The best performing reactor in the world in terms of 
average lifetime load factor is Grohnde in Germany (ibid). On many other indicators including construction costs, 
capital costs, operating costs, and load factor, Germany is considered to host one of the best performing nuclear 
engineering industries in the world (137). This is in strong contrast to the UK, where it is noted by UK policy 
makers and key reports that the UK performs strikingly poorly overall on most international comparisons related 
to plant performance (125,138). 
 
3.3.2: Comparison of constitution of respective nuclear industries in Germany and the UK 
Both Germany and (with its longer nuclear history) the UK have substantial expertise supporting nuclear services 
such as fuel fabrication and enrichment as well as ‘backend’ activities like decommissioning and the managing 
of nuclear wastes. However the most salient factor with regard to industrial commitments to new build (rather 
than clean-up) relates to the comparative strengths of the national nuclear engineering sector. Table 4 provides 
information on the relative standing of key engineering companies, the international profile of nuclear operators 










                                                          
2 The highly distinct nature of the technologies involved means that this analysis of the nuclear engineering 
sector is limited to nuclear fission, rather than also including nuclear fusion. R&D data gathered from IEA is 
based on category 41 labelled ‘nuclear fission’, which excludes R&D related to nuclear fusion activities. The 










Sources: (138–141)  
3.3.3: Research and development in nuclear power 
The relative scale of research and development efforts in nuclear fission also provide an interesting basis for 
comparison between the UK and Germany. The graphs below charts historic UK and German expenditure on 
nuclear R&D. Germany has consistently spent more money on nuclear-related R&D than the UK (fig. 4a) and 
Fig.4b shows the nuclear proportion of total civilian energy R&D spend in each country: 
 
 
Source: IEA (142) 
 
 
3.3.4 Share of global nuclear patents (national aggregate and by company) 
Another indicator of the relative strength of nuclear engineering activity, is the volume of patenting for nuclear 
fission technologies. Whilst there are many pitfalls in seeking to use patent data as indicators (143) and 
conclusions regarding the strength of nuclear industry cannot be made on this parameter alone, a relevant 
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‘innovation index’ nevertheless shows striking results providing a salient signal regarding the relative success of 
German and UK nuclear industries depicted in figures 5a,b and c below.  
 
Sources: Lévêque (144), Berthélemy (145)  
 
 
Figure 5a indicates German patenting compares favourably even with that of France, as the historic global leader 
in nuclear construction (146). In order to resolve the far less significant position of the UK, direct patenting data 
can be examined. Figure 5b shows the share of total patents relating to nuclear power over the past few decades 
between key countries. Germany has the second largest share following the USA, with 25% of worldwide 
patents, whilst the UK has only a 2% share. The absolute numbers of patents behind this picture is shown in 
Figure 5c for the period 1974-2008, with Germany again significantly outperforming the UK. 
If patterns at the firm level are felt more relevant, it is significant that three German companies (Siemens, 
Kraftwerk Union, and Hochtemperatur-Reactor) perform among the top ten in the world for nuclear patent 
applications. UK organisations feature only at the bottom of the table, with Babcock and Wilcox at 7th lowest 
and the Atomic Energy Authority holding the second lowest number of patent applications of those surveyed.  
3.3.3: Ceteris paribus proposition 
Table 5 (below) summarises the overall picture under this criterion. It is clear that Germany has a far stronger 
nuclear industry on nearly all counts than the UK. All else being equal, nuclear discontinuation might under this 








Table 5: Summary table of nuclear R&D in Germany and the UK 
 
Source: compilation of previous sources above.  
 
3.4.:  Availability of national renewable energy resources  
 
3.4.1 Overall renewable resource 
 
A further important consideration when thinking about the substituting of nuclear power by alternative low 
carbon strategies, is the potential magnitude of national renewable energy resources and the costs and 
operational ease with which these can be harnessed (this is a separate matter to the realised scale of national 
renewable industries, which forms a distinct criterion later).  In these terms, the renewable resource base is best 
understood as the energy that might potentially be utilised under standardised assumptions concerning 
resource availability and economic costs of exploitation. This involves both theoretical and technical 
considerations that are well explored in various intensive studies conducted across different European countries 
on a comparable basis (147). The overall position as between Germany and the UK is quite unambiguous.  
 
In the case of hydroelectricity, most feasible sites in the UK are considered to be already utilised (150), with the 
technical challenge lying simply (and more marginally) in plant improvement. With other technologies, however, 
the picture is different. However, the UK has 40% of the total economic wind energy resource in EuropeIt is 
repeatedly and without controversy assessed to enjoy the best wind resources on the continent (151–154).  As 
the ‘windiest place in Europe’ (155), the UK has vast potentials for viable offshore wind power. Scotland alone 
has 25% of the total European offshore wind resource (148). The picture is similar for wave and tidal power, 
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where the UK alone is assessed to hold 50% of the total economic European potential (156). The Severn estuary 




A more detailed picture can be resolved in ‘cost-resource curves’ for the most important renewable resources. 
A systematic analysis of this kind for onshore wind power by Held (157) in Figure 5a and by the European 
Environment Agency in figure 5b, shows the costs at which successively larger volumes of energy production can 
be realised from this source in different European countries. The UK is by far the most well-endowed country in 











Solar is arguably the second most important renewable resource. Here, the demanding nature of this kind of 
analysis, means that cost curves for solar are harder to come by. However the Green-X study in 2003 does give 
a quite comprehensive indication across Europe for 2020, of both potential capacities and their associated cost 
profiles in €/ MWh. As detailed in Resch et al (159) some parts of the UK have comparable solar resources to 
Germany, yet have not exploited this resource. With resource magnitudes partly driven by the larger area of 
Germany when compared to the UK, discrepancies between resource potential and relative costs are small. 
Table 6 below, details the key differences: 
 









Marine Energy  
 
Looking further into the future, other important renewable resources include marine energy from wave and 
tidal power. Whilst costs are more difficult to ascertain confidently for these options, they will be comparable 
between the two countries. It is clear again that the large coastline of the UK leads it to enjoy far more favourable 










Biomass is also an important potential renewable energy source in both the UK and Germany. Here precision in 
cost-resource estimates are complicated by greater contextual variability – for instance in production of 
agricultural residues and other diverse forms of potential biomass resource. The table below (table 7) however, 
summarises key recent estimates of the mid-term potential and costs of biomass in both Germany and the UK. 
Depending on assumptions, it should be noted that the position of Germany might be generally more favourable 
than suggested in this table, due to the relatively greater access to important sources in Scandinavia. However, 
if landfill gas is considered to be a form of biomass (often the case in the UK, where it is arguably among the 
most attractive of such resources), the long-standing adoption of recycling and incineration as waste 












Source: Fhg-isi, Huber, & Eeg, (161) 
 
 
3.4.6 Ceteris paribus proposition 
 
On this basis, it is possible despite the diversities, complexities and ambiguities to conclude both in terms of the 
scale of the overall resource and the costs at which different tranches are available, that the UK unequivocally 
enjoys a superior overall national renewable energy endowment to Germany. This applies especially to the most 
important on- and offshore wind resources, as well as to wave and tidal and many other particular forms of 
renewable energy, on which it is harder to be precise. Specifically with respect to solar power and some biomass 
sources, Germany appears slightly better off, but the differences are marginal when compared to the 
countervailing situation for other technologies. With much of the data substantiating this picture going back to 
the 1970s (162–164)  the manifestly more favourable position of alternatives mean that nuclear discontinuation 






3.5. The scale of national industrial capacities and interests in harnessing renewable 
energy supply  
This section provides an overview of industrial capacities in Germany and the UK associated with the 
development of national renewable energy resources. Using IEA data, a series of tables document growth in 
various renewable technologies from 1990-2016 (conveying market scale), R&D expenditure into various 
renewables technologies (as a proxy for likely support in certain technologies), and an assessment of the 
comparative position of renewables industries and equipment supply industries in each country. An associated 
wider narrative analysis of renewable developments in these countries has also been undertaken by the authors 
(and is consistent with this picture), but is reported on elsewhere (98 p.44).  
 
 
3.5.1: Growth of renewables in Germany and the UK 
 
Growth in overall renewables production in Germany and the UK  
 
Figure 8 highlights the overall growth in renewables production in German and the UK. While Germany made an 
earlier start in terms of policy support for renewables, in recent years the UK’s share of renewables in electricity 









As Figures 9a and 9b (below) illustrate in both absolute and relative terms, Germany has deployed more wind 
capacity at an earlier stage than the UK, however in terms of the share of wind in electricity generation (fig. 9b), 
the UK has caught up with Germany in the last few years. This is in part a result of the UK’s disproportionately 





Source: IEA (132) 
 
 
This greater offshore wind resource, has seen the UK enabling a larger absolute deployment of offshore wind 
(fig.10).  
 









Figure 11 shows the growth in solar capacity in both Germany and the UK. Again, Germany experienced more 
rapid growth in solar power, with UK growth beginning several years after Germany with the Feed in Tariff 



















Germany and the UK have both utilised biowaste and biofuels, which have grown as a proportion of electricity 
production as seen from the tables below (fig 12a and 12b). In the UK increasing use of biomass was supported 
through the Non-Fossil Fuels Obligation and then the Renewables Obligation, with DECC later implementing 
Feed-In-Tariffs for small scale biomass in 2010. In Germany biomass has been stimulated by the Electricity Act 






Source: IEA (132) 
 
What is undoubtedly clear is that across most technological areas, Germany has generally deployed more 
renewable energy, beginning in most cases, at a notably earlier stage than the UK. An exception here is with 
offshore wind, where UK resource endowments lead it to be a world leader in terms of total installed capacity. 
But even here, the lead roles taken in the exploiting of this by non-UK (including German) renewable energy 
firms) (173,174) diminishes the salience of this contrast 3.  
                                                          
3 Despite the UK’s global lead in terms of amount of installed offshore wind capacity, much of the value of these projects in 
the UK is accrued by companies headquartered in other countries including Germany. 92.7% of offshore wind capacity is 
owned by companies not headquartered in the UK (284). Many offshore wind developments have only 32% UK content 
(285). UK companies have only a 5% share of the overall European offshore wind market (285). Only 18% of manufacturing 
and construction is sourced in the UK (284), with major UK supply chain gaps in turbine construction and foundation supply. 
Given 50% of the value of a typical offshore wind project accrues from turbine construction, considerable value is not being 




3.5.2: Research and development  
 
The next parameter of interest in this area, concerns general comparative patterns in research, development 
and demonstration in the renewables area across the two case study settings. The figures below trace the 
absolute expenditure on renewable R&D4 in the two countries (Fig. 13a) and the percentage share of R&D 
expenditure for renewables as a share of total R&D expenditure on energy (fig. 13b), and the table that follows 




Source: IEA (142) 
 
 





Source: IEA (142) 
 
The UK devoted a smaller share of energy R&D to renewable energy sources until 2002 when the UK rapidly 
increased its share of energy R&D spent on renewables. This declined sharply in 2008 following the financial 
crisis and again in 2010 following change in Government. What is most interesting from our perspective 
however, is that in the 1970s through the early 1980s the share of energy R&D spent on renewables by the UK 
and Germany were comparable before Germany began to rapidly increase its R&D spend on renewables 
following reorientation of spending due to policy responses to Chernobyl.  
 
Figures 14a, b and c below show R&D funding for different types of renewable energy. Activity in both Germany 
and the UK was sparked initially by the Oil Crisis of 1974. The countries both took different approaches as 
documented by the following figures: 
 
                                                          
accrue an additional net £500m-£600m for the UK economy so significant revenue is currently flowing out of the UK based 
on current content levels.  
4 This relates to overall renewable energy rather than just renewable electricity production, however, as with nuclear 





Source: IEA (142) 
 
 
During the 1970s in the UK there was substantial public investment in ocean energy whilst Germany was 
negligible. Germany has spent consistently more on solar R&D than the UK since the early 1970s. Germany began 
to invest substantially in wind energy R&D in 1977, with a notable peak of spending the equivalent of €40 million 
in 1981, before a rapid decrease in spending. It should be noted that throughout the 1980s, the UK was spending 
on par, or in some years, spending more than Germany throughout the period from 1982-1992 a crucial 
formative period preceding the ‘take off’ of the Energiewende. In terms of R&D spend on wind energy as a 
percentage of total renewables R&D funding the UK was devoting a greater share of its R&D resource to wind 










Thus, Throughout the 1980s the UK was spending at similar levels to Germany (fig.14c) and devoting a greater 
share of its renewables budget to wind power (fig. 15). This was despite Germany’s initial steep and short lived 
increase in renewables spending at the end of the 70s.  
 
 
3.5.3: Industrial strength – equipment supply industries 
 
The tables below aim to give a general overview of differing aspects of the equipment supply industries of 
Germany and the UK with respect to renewable energy. Once more, it must be added that given space 
constraints this is by no means exhaustive, however aims to outline the general patterns.  
 





Sources: (132,175–177)  
 
Table 10: Wind Energy Industry 
 
Sources: BVG Associates, Lütkenhorst & Pegels, RenewableUK, Wind Power Monthly (130,178–180)  












Table 12: Solar industry overview 
 
Sources: (139,143–145)  




Sources: (132,176,185)  
 
3.5.4: Ceteris paribus proposition  
 
From the above it can be concluded on the face of it that – as of the current situation – Germany has a stronger 
renewables sector than the UK with greater penetration in the electricity mix and dominance in supply chains 
for renewable technology. The UK has however lead the way in recent years in terms of deployment of offshore 
wind, as measured by capacity. Yet this has growth has to a significant extent been driven by industrial leadership 
on the part of non-UK (including German) companies. In seeking to draw conclusions from this complex picture 
with regard to aspects that are relatively ‘internal’ or ‘external’ to regime theory, a crucial issue concerns time. 
The current relative status of renewable industries in the UK as compared with Germany might as reasonably be 
seen as consequences as they are drivers, of the divergent national energy trajectories. As reflected in the data 
reviewed above, for instance, it is difficult to understand the recent move of Siemens from being a leader in 
nuclear technology and a leader in renewable technology, without reference to the changed climate over the 
past fifteen years or so in German energy policy that it is precisely the point of this analysis to address (186). 
In order to address this point fully, what would be necessary would be a more historical analysis of the relative 
situations in the relevant national renewable industrial bases in German and the UK at a time prior to the 
emergence of a significant divergence in the orientations of national energy strategies analysed here. But in 
going back to a period before large scale development of renewables there emerges a challenge in identifying 
confidently exactly which related areas of engineering, manufacturing and the service sector might in the period 
around 1990 most strongly have identified their interests (and thus pressured) a move into renewables. To take 
the main area of current policy activity highlighted in the above comparison, the case of offshore wind might be 
considered as an example. In the relevant period around the early 1990s, before the divergence of UK and 
German policies, various sources are clear that it might as readily be thought that the relatively much more 
advanced status of the UK offshore engineering and services industry, might have justified an expectation than 
that it would be the UK that was best placed to exploit the massive growth in offshore activity that has since 
been seen in UK waters. Yet, the prominence in unfolding history of Danish, German, Dutch and Spanish firms 
in various parts of this UK business shows this national opportunity to have remained unrealised 5.   
The complexity of this picture urges, a cautious interpretation with respect to the hypothesis under examination 
here. Conservatively, then, it must be held to be difficult to be sure which of the two countries might have been 
expected most likely to make a move to renewables, on the basis of a criterion concerning the readiness and 
state of development of the emergent industry in each setting. There are arguments that this might initially have 
been thought to have been the UK. But these risk over-interpretation of history. There are arguments that it was 
                                                          
5 In a discussion on lessons for UK industrial policy and the UK’s notable offshore industrial base that was present in the 
1980s, Smith notes that opportunities for transferring UK offshore supply chains to offshore wind development have not 
been taken, outlining that: “applying the core principles of the Offshore Supplies Office (OSO) to offshore wind farms… would 
have seen the UK attempt to build its own supply chain rather than import or subsidise foreign companies…. Instead, the UK 
content of wind farm developments stands at about 30 per cent” (286). 
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Germany that was better placed. But these hinge on unfoldings of later developments, and so risk taking 
consequences as causes. A prudent conclusion must be that this parameter is indeterminate. 
 
3.6. Relative scales of military-related nuclear activities and interests 
 
3.6.1 Nuclear weapons capabilities 
The difference between the UK and Germany regarding nuclear weaponry is stark. Put briefly: the UK is one of 
only five official nuclear weapons states recognised under the global Non Proliferation Treaty and Germany is 
not. While Germany hosts US missiles at the Büchel air base it does not itself produce or deploy nuclear 
warheads. The UK on the other hand is estimated presently to have around 120 operational nuclear warheads 
(187) with an extensive history of nuclear weapons design, development, production, support and testing – 
notably involving current dedicated facilities at Atomic Weapons Establishments in Aldermaston and Burghfield. 
This infrastructure requires a range of specialist nuclear (and other) engineering skills, some of which hold 
commonalities with skills required in the civil nuclear sector (188). The maintaining of viable nuclear weapons 
arsenals also requires supplies of a variety of fissile and other specialised nuclear materials – for instance 
produced by the joint civil-military nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities operated by British Nuclear 
Fuels. Since weapons decommissioning programmes at the end of the Cold War, stockpiles of these materials 
have grown, effectively reducing demand for ongoing production. Even when attention is restricted directly to 
nuclear weapons manufacturing, however (rather than materials supply), more than 4000 people are employed 
across the AWE Aldermaston and Burghfield sites related to building, maintaining and decommissioning 
warheads (189) There is no such infrastructure in Germany. 
3.6.2 Wider Military Nuclear Infrastructures  
In order to be considered militarily credible under prevailing attitudes, nuclear weapons require a far larger 
infrastructure than that concerned simply with production and deployment of the warheads themselves. The 
UK has effectively contracted out core capabilities around ballistic missile delivery vehicles to the US Trident 
missile supply chain. But very large scale industrial capabilities are nonetheless still required in servicing and 
maintaining these technologies – and especially in the design, manufacture, operation and regulation of the 
fleet of four Royal Navy Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) that serve as platforms from which 
UK strategic nuclear weapons can be launched. With each of these vessels counted among the most complex 
technological artefacts ever produced (190), the task of sustaining these capabilities is very demanding. For 
instance, the additional great expense of making the supporting fleet of six Trafalgar and Astute -class attack 
submarines (SSNs) also nuclear (rather than conventionally) propelled, is itself justified partly as a means to 
sustain a viable national nuclear submarine industrial base amidst what would otherwise be an untenably sparse 
production schedule for SSBNs (188,191–194).  
So, when all manufacturing and servicing functions and facilities are taken together, the scale of the UK industrial 
infrastructure required to maintain national military nuclear capabilities is very considerable (195). Those 
employed in the industry taken as a whole – including major transnational military contractors BAE Systems, 
Rolls Royce, Babcock and dozens of other companies (196,197) – are variously estimated at around 30,000 
(198,199). Challenges in meeting the associated demand for highly specialist skills in research, design, 
engineering, operations, servicing and regulation is a major preoccupation of Government (192,200). Whilst the 
UK has committed to a major renewal programme for its military nuclear infrastructures (201) (202), Germany 




3.6.3 Ceteris paribus proposition  
Judgements under this criterion depend on whether prevailing official claims are held to be credible, concerning 
the notionally separate status of military and civil nuclear industries and infrastructures (203,204). Whatever 
view is taken, however, the shared industrial and skills base makes the maintaining of military nuclear 
capabilities at least to some extent a positive aid to the sustaining of parallel civil nuclear infrastructures (205–
207). With the scale and significance of associated reinforcing effects a currently topical point at issue (208–
211), it can nonetheless be concluded that the presence of major military nuclear programmes in only one of 
the two countries exercise at least some effects making civil nuclear discontinuation less likely in the UK than in 
Germany.  
 
3.7 Public attitudes and social movement activity 
 
3.7.1: General public opinion on nuclear power 
Public opinion is a complex multidimensional phenomenon, highly dependent on framing and varying 
significantly over time. So it is difficult to undertake in the space of this article any in-depth analysis of changes 
in public opinion over the long time period of nuclear developments in the UK and Germany. What is possible in 
this section, however, is a review of public opinion surveys  during more recent nuclear policy developments as 
well as during key formative events in the 1980s. Although not exhaustive, this enables a view that is at the same 
time current and targeted on the most salient junctures.  
In these terms, Germany is generally regarded as being distinguished by an especially strongly critical public 
attitude to nuclear power (212). Indeed, this is often held up as the reason for the remarkable strategic shift 
embodied in the Energiewende (213). Yet in seeking to gauge how much this understanding is sufficient, it is 
important to give more nuanced attention to the volatilities in public attitudes over time and under different 
framings, as well as the diverse ways in which they can be apprehended , articulated – and manipulated – in 
policy. Since results of opinion polls are so sensitive to encompassing political environments and to ways 
questions are posed, lack of attention to this dimension could confuse public opinion as a symptom and as a 
driver of developments.  
In general, polls conducted over the past few years do at face value indicate greater public opposition to nuclear 
power in Germany than the UK (214,215). However, care is needed in order to account for differences over time 
since the picture contrasts quite interestingly before and after Fukushima. The sense of feasible alternatives and 
realised agency associated with the unfolding of Energiewende might be seen as a driver as well as an effect of 
public opinion. Indeed, polls have indicated for many years that only a minority of both the British and German 
public tend to favour nuclear power. In 2005, for instance, only 22% of respondents in Germany agreed that 
nuclear power is a relatively safe and important source of electricity, and new plants should be built, compared 
with 33% in the UK (216). In 2010 the NEA published an extensive report on public opinions on nuclear, charting 





Source: NEA (217) 
This NEA report also documents the interesting finding that differences between Germany and the UK are even 
less clear-cut when the issue of climate change is considered. When a prompt is provided to the effect that 
nuclear power offers a significant climate change mitigation strategy, support for nuclear moves from 22% to 
38% in Germany and from 33% to 44% in the UK, leaving the figures differing by only 6 percentage points (217).  
It is also important to consider public opinion going right back to the turbulent period of the 1970s and 80s 
associated with the initial conceiving of the current German Energiewende (186). Though limited in number, 
opinion polls in both Germany and the UK at the beginning of this period showed generally favourable attitudes 
towards nuclear (218). This began to change only as the issue became more controversial in the late 1970s. 
Opinion polls conducted in 1982 showed 52% of respondents in Germany to favour new nuclear power with 46% 
opposed whilst polls in the UK indicated that only 34% of respondents were in favour with 53% opposed (219).  
In a poll taken a few months after Chernobyl, 70% opposed nuclear power in Germany and 75% opposed nuclear 
power in the UK (ibid). So patterns of public opinion in the two countries during the formative periods in which 
current elite policy commitments first began to develop, give little basis for considering Germany to be markedly 
more anti-nuclear than the UK – indeed sometimes suggesting the opposite.  
 
3.7.2: Public confidence in the nuclear sector 
Within the broader field of public attitudes, one framing of interest concerns relative levels of confidence in the 
civil nuclear sector (including governmental departments, regulators and the nuclear utilities). Figure 17 below 
outlines differences across Europe in 2010 (before Fukushima) concerning public confidence in nuclear 
regulators, operators, and legislators. Notably, Germany and the UK are again quite similar (identified 
respectively as ‘DE’ and ‘UK’), each featuring in the middle of the range. 
 
Source: NEA (217) 
What can be seen here is that the UK demonstrates only marginally greater levels of public trust in nuclear 
regulators and operators than does Germany. With confidence in legislation indicated by the size of the bubble, 
it can be seen that Germany actually displays a greater level of confidence in nuclear legislation – also  displaying 
greater levels of trust in nuclear legislation than in the supposedly most nuclear-supportive context of France.  
Following Chernobyl in the late 1980s, Peters et al (1987) quoted in Renn (219) found that 60% of Germans 




3.7.3 Public perceptions of nuclear risk 
From the point of view of nuclear proponents, another popular way to frame public attitudes to nuclear power, 
is in terms of perceptions of the acceptability of nuclear risks. Again using NEA data, Figure 18 relates perceived 
knowledge and perceived risks of nuclear technology in different countries including both countries that have 
nuclear power as part of their energy mix and some that do not.  
 
Source: NEA (217) 
The idea behind this interest of nuclear polling in links between knowledge and risk perception, is the 
widespread notion that opposition to nuclear power reflects knowledge deficit (220). As stated in the NEA report 
“…people who feel informed about nuclear safety tend to perceive less risk than those who feel uninformed” 
(175: 23). A striking detailed feature of Figure 18, however, is the specific comparison between results for 
Germany and the UK. Germans display greater self-perceived knowledge of nuclear power yet are more 
concerned that nuclear risks outweigh the advantages. For the UK lower levels of knowledge are associated with 
a higher proportion of respondents believing advantages outweigh risks. Again it seems that other factors may 
be at work in shaping public attitudes in these countries – at least as these are measurable in polls. 
 
3.7.4 Scale of social movement action 
Both the UK and Germany experienced rapid rises in opposition to nuclear power with the growth of the Green 
movement and associated NGOs in the 1970s. In Germany the maximal scale of protests were greater and more 
confrontational. In some German protests violent clashes with the police involved over 100,000 people and a 
diverse range of German civil society (100,221). The UK also experienced protests against nuclear construction 
in the 1980s and 1990s. However these were smaller with a maximum size of between 3,000-5,000 (222). In 
short, although public attitudes in the two countries as discussed above, were not very different, a significantly 
larger and more active grassroots opposition movement formed in Germany than in the UK.  
 
3.7.5 Intensity of public debate including media mentions 
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In a study of media coverage of the Fukushima disaster, Wittneben (13), suggests that media reporting both of 
nuclear issues in general and of this disaster in particular were both more detailed and more continuous in 
Germany than in the UK. Kepplinger and Lemke, (2015) confirm significantly fewer articles in the UK on the 
Fukushima accident compared to Germany and far fewer articles discussed Fukushima in the context of domestic 
nuclear power. They also document that ‘left leaning’ German newspapers tended to write articles that were 
critical of nuclear power following the accident. In the UK by contrast, the most widely read article on nuclear 
issues following the disaster was a piece written by prominent journalist George Monbiot in the left-leaning 
Guardian, arguing somewhat strikingly that Fukushima had made him ‘stop worrying’ and ‘love’ nuclear power 
(223). It is a continuing feature of the UK when compared with Germany, that mainstream media perspectives 
on nuclear issues are markedly more favourable than are public attitudes.   
3.7.6 Prominence of evidence concerning renewable pathways  
Another point that may have a bearing on public attitudes is the relative prominence of academic and policy 
literatures in each country that discuss future energy scenarios based around the technical potential and cost-
effectiveness of renewables and energy efficiency, compared with literatures that emphasise a ‘need’ for 
nuclear. In Germany, a significant 1980 report by the Öko-Institut outlined “growth and prosperity without 
petroleum or uranium” (188, p.3). Albeit less attended to in media and policy debates, however, it is clear that 
there also exists in the UK an abundance not only of independent studies, but also of official assessments that 
highlight the cost-effective potential for non-nuclear energy scenarios. Key organisations in this regard include 
the Energy Technology Support Unit (ETSU), the Watt Committee and the Renewable Energy Advisory Group 
(162,164). So it certainly is not the case that there was any absence of official literature regarding non-nuclear 
future energy scenarios in the UK over the time period when German and UK policy began to diverge.  
It is true, however, that governmental reports at the highest levels in the UK have emphasised the role of nuclear 
for future electricity generation. An especially important juncture in this regard is around 2005, when the a 
striking volte face was undertaken by the Government of Tony Blair (110) that has remained central to official 
policy analyses ever since (224). Only two years before, the 2003 White Paper proposed after a detailed and 
largely independent energy review conducted by the Performance Innovation Unit (PIU) (225), an effectively 
non-nuclear energy future based around a shift towards renewables and energy efficiency (226). Whilst more 
detailed or assertive conclusions under this parameter are inhibited by the scope and complexity of the task, it 
certainly cannot be concluded that there was any absence of high level policy evidence concerning the viability 
of non-nuclear energy futures in the UK. What primarily distinguishes the UK and Germany are the policy 
responses, rather than the evidence itself.  
  
3.7.7 Ceteris paribus proposition 
This discussion has illuminated grounds for more nuanced questioning of received assumptions that the 
differences between German and UK nuclear policy are simply due to higher levels of public scepticism in the 
former than in the latter setting. It appears that other factors may be in play, including the ways these attitudes 
are framed, articulated with policy making and reflected in mainstream media discourse. Evidence in the public 
domain is as clear about the potential for non-nuclear energy futures in the UK as in Germany. Overall, however, 
it nonetheless remains the case that generally greater historic levels of anti-nuclear mobilisation mean that – all 
else being equal – nuclear discontinuation might be understood to be more likely in Germany than in the UK. 
 




3.8.1: Centralised / decentralised political systems 
The UK presents a more centralised political system than Germany and one of the most centralised in the OECD 
(227). Decision-making powers concerning a wide range of activities are all decided at the national level at 
Westminster, including taxation, economic policies, health care and education. Despite recent varying moves 
towards ‘devolution’ of powers to the constituting nations of the UK (Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland), 
English regions retain very little agency in over policy making (228) and the UK remains remarkably centralised. 
This contrasts strongly with the decentralised German system, where considerably greater political powers are 
located at the regional level. Since Germany is a federal democracy divided into 16 regions or Länder, only  
Federal Laws apply to the whole of Germany, with other laws being applicable only to the Land in question (229). 
 
3.8.2: Prominence of the Green Party 
Constituting the most distinctively critical voice on nuclear power among major parties both in the UK and 
Germany, the prominence of the Green party offers a useful proxy for the agency afforded to this perspective 
in elite political cultures. With respect to public opinion examined earlier (Section 3.7) broadly comparable levels 
of scepticism concerning nuclear power are documented for the UK and Germany (at 38/44%). Yet the 
proportional representation system makes it much easier in Germany than in Britain for the Green Party to gain 
parliamentary seats that represent this view. The Greens have been involved in mainstream German political 
life since the 1980’s (186,230), including forming a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
in 1998 which was pivotal in implementing the German Nuclear Exit Law of 2002 (97). In a relatively stable recent 
pattern, 67 of 709 seats in the Bundestag are currently taken by die Grunen, whilst has over the period surveyed 
here seen only one Green among 650 members of the UK House of Commons.  
3.8.3 Ceteris paribus proposition 
Given the prominence of the Green Party in particular, and greater decision-making capabilities of different 
regions in Germany, it could be said that – all else being equal – discontinuation would be more likely in Germany 
than the UK given the greater plurality of interests and voices that are able to influence policy.  
 
3.9 Qualities of national democracies 
 
3.9.1:  Tendency to deliberative-style politics 
Building on earlier criteria concerning patterns in public attitudes, political mobilisation and elite policy cultures, 
this section addresses the crucial but controversial and intangible issue of the quality of the democracy within 
which these processes play out. If democracy is conceived in the most general terms as ‘access by the least 
powerful to the capacities for challenging power’ (231)(48), then questions are raised over the efficacy with 
which particular institutions and procedures variously help enable or constrain this multifaceted struggle. A 
number of different aspects bear on this question. Among many efforts to ‘rank’ and ‘compare’ different 
qualities of democracy (discussed below), one pervasive issue concerns the extent to which politics in general is 
deliberative or confrontational. To what extent do prevailing political processes and discourses enable or 
obstruct serious questioning of the reasoning behind incumbent policy commitments (232)? 
Here, it is a repeated finding that – against a background of much complexity and diversity – Germany displays 
a generally more deliberative style of politics than the UK. Across all social sectors, Germany tends to afford 
greater provision for ‘negotiation’ between different groups (including businesses, trade unions, and various 
political parties) to produce a shared vision. This contrasts with greater UK tendency towards majoritarian rule 
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(233). In part reflecting the proportional voting system discussed above, more political parties and a greater 
frequency of coalitions also condition a need for more deliberative approaches in Germany (234). Here, the UK 
exemplifies by contrast, an ‘adversarial’ political system in which coalitions are rare, and notable groups such as 
trade unions are relatively excluded from high level decision making in situations where they would be regarded 
in Germany as core to the policy process (235).  
This difference in the deliberative style of politics can also be seen in more specific relation to the nuclear issue. 
The 2002 German Nuclear Exit Law was based around four years of negotiations between diverse interest 
groups. Following Fukushima, environmental groups played a central role in negotiations around nuclear power 
through participation in the Ethics Commission (236). In the UK, by contrast, the official review of the 
implications of the Fukushima disaster was a highly technical process with virtually no input from civil society 
(237). Even nuclear proponents routinely note that wider UK policy making on nuclear power has repeatedly 
been characterised not only by a relative lack of consultation, but by a remarkably high level of secrecy (110).  
 
3.9.2 Majoritarian vs consensual democracies 
Table 14 stems from research characterising different ‘patterns’ of democracy  (233,234). Here, Lijphart’s work 
identifies a key difference between ‘majoritarian’ and ‘consensual’ democracies, which also notably 
distinguishes Germany and the UK. The ‘Westminster model’ is used as the archtypal example of a majoritarian 
democracy in Lijphart’s terms, whereas Germany is considered to be more of a consensual democracy. Although 
of course there are many detailed points of variance and nuance in the on-going transformations in British and 
German political systems,  Lijphart’s (166: 7-8) conclusion is that “…consensus democracies scores significantly 
higher on a wide array of indicators of democratic quality and they also have better records with regards to 
governing effectiveness”.  
Table 14: Majoritarian (UK) and consensual (Germany) comparison 
 
Source: Lijphart (234) 
 
 
3.9.3 Democracy Barometer analysis  
Undertaking a wider apppraisal of qualities of democracy in different countries, the Democracy Barometer 
project examines 30 ‘established’ democracies judging each in relation to 3 ‘principles’ and nine ‘functions’ 
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including ‘freedom’ (individual liberties, rule of law, public sphere), ‘control’ (competition, mutual constraints, 
Governmental capability), and ‘equality’ (transparency, participation, representation) (78). When 30 selected 
countries are ranked under this framework, a stark contrast again emerges between the UK and Germany. 
Germany is ranked 11th and the UK is ranked at 26 (238). Despite the inherent ambiguities in such an analysis, it 
seems again that the qualities of British democracy are uncontroversially poorer than those in Germany.  
 
3.9.4 Economist Intelligence Unit analysis 
The Economist Intelligence Unit produced in 2010 a further important report that ranks qualities of 167 
democracies. In this case, the index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; 
the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture (239). Under this analysis, Germany 
is rated 14th and the UK 19th. Again, despite the scope for divergent interpretations, it is difficult to avoid 
concluding that the UK displays a generally lower quality of democracy than does Germany. 
 
3.9.5 Global Democracy Ranking analysis 
The Global Democracy Ranking is undertaken by the Democracy Ranking Association in Vienna. This framing of 
relative qualities of democracy in 113 countries is again based around several indicators covering aspects 
including gender balances, press freedom, corruption, political party change, change of head of government, 
civil liberties, political rights (240). Under this analysis the same picture emerges as under others, with Germany 
ranked 8th and the UK ranked 13th (241) . 
Cetaris parabus proposition 
Table 15 below summarises some of the key findings discussed above concerning the variously evidently 
significantly more positive qualities of democracy widely identified in Germany when compared with the UK. 
Despite the complexities and multiple dimensions, there seems on balance in these terms, to be generally 
greater opportunities in Germany than the UK, for less powerful interests to access the capacities to challenge 
different kinds and aspects of power. If the literatures reviewed earlier in this study are correct, then it appears 
from the extant contrasting directions of development in the two countries, that nuclear power is better able to 
thrive under conditions in which democracy is constrained. To the extent this is true, it can therefore be 
concluded that discontinuation of nuclear power is more likely in Germany than the UK.  
Table 15: Summary table of democratic rankings 
 






4. Discussion of findings 
4.1 Summary of Key Patterns 
With respect to a wide general literature employing various kinds of ‘regime theory’ to analyse ‘sociotechnical 
transitions’, this study has undertaken an analysis that is highly unusual in its aims at falsification and 
unprecedented in the detail with which a diversity of parameters are given balanced attention. With respect 
specifically to studies comparing the circumstances of energy policy in the UK and Germany, this study is also 
distinctive in seeking systematically to test in a symmetrical way, the relative salience of different potentially 
formative factors (242). Below is a table summarising how Germany and the UK compare under 29 parameters 
organised according to nine criteria that are distinguished according to whether they are ‘internal’ or ‘external 
to the attention of prevailing theory in this field. A short text in each case indicates the broad picture that may 
be inferred from the discussion so far.  










From the above summary table, a quite clear picture emerges of the comparative implications for reasonable 
judgements over the relative likelihood according to different criteria of a discontinuation in nuclear power in 
Germany when compared with the UK. First, the picture is especially stark with regard to considerations that 
are most central to conventional sociotechnical regime theory. All else being equal, it might be expected under 
criteria concerning: (i) general market conditions; (ii) nuclear penetration in the generating mix; (iii) the strength 
of domestic nuclear manufacturing industries; and (iv) the scale and costs of available renewable energy 
resources; that Germany would be a significantly less favourable environment than the UK, for the successful 
challenge of nuclear incumbency. As aspects bearing on the relative strength of the ‘focal regime/niche 
configuration’ around nuclear power and its directly-associated challenger niches, these are all factors that are 
relatively ‘internal’ to conventional theorising on sociotechnical transitions.  
 
The picture is less clear under one other ‘internal’ criterion (v), concerning strength of potential industrial 
interests in relation to renewables. This clearly relates to the ‘focal regime/niche configuration’, but the pattern 
in this regard is open to divergent interpretations. In one view based on the current situation, the currently 
relatively large scale of the German renewables industry does seem (counter to the above pattern) correctly to 
predict discontinuation in Germany rather than the UK.  In another view, however, this might be seen more as 
a consequence than as a driver of the divergent policy orientations. If a longer time frame is considered, going 
back (say) to the early 1990s, then the similar status of nascent renewables in each country and the much larger 
scale of UK offshore engineering and services industries, might (given the disproportionate revealed importance 
of offshore wind as a renewable resource) have led to an expectation that it would be the UK that would move 
first and most seriously, towards a renewable pathway.  As result – and given the need for prudence with respect 
to hypothesis confirmation – it is difficult to draw a single unqualified conclusion in respect of this parameter.  
 
With respect to ‘external’ criteria, however, the pattern is again striking. These criteria concern: (vi) the scale of 
nuclear military activities; (vii) characteristics of formally institutionalised national political culture; (viii) 
activities of wider social movements, and (ix) assessments of democratic quality. These issues relate more to an 
entire national economy and polity than to the particular ‘focal regime/niche configuration’ around nuclear 
power and its renewable ‘challenger niches’. This time, the evidence under each criterion does seem clearly to 
predict the actual course of development, with nuclear discontinuation being consistently recognised to be more 
likely in Germany than in the UK. Thus despite the undoubted complexities, uncertainties and ambiguities 
addressed in this analysis, the overall general pattern may confidently be held to be substantiated in this case, 
under which criteria that are highlighted in the formal frameworks of mainstream regime theory tend to make 
incorrect predictions in respect of this particular axis of comparison, whilst criteria that are less prominent in 
these theories tend to be more correct.  
 




The claim that the most salient aspects in understanding this distinction between German and British nuclear 
trajectories are generally ‘external’ to a field as diverse and well-established as sociotechnical transitions studies, 
will inevitably raise queries. This literature is so voluminous, that exceptions can of course always be found – 
with specific discussions making reference to particular issues that might legitimately be pointed out to relate 
to those addressed here. Accordingly, a number of studies in this field have made reference to themes relating 
to the relevant characteristics of general national political institutions and elite cultures (42,70,250,113,243–
249)  as well to the presence and activity levels of social movements (251–253). Yet it is often a point made in 
these discussions themselves, that this attention remains relatively marginal or novel in respect of the field as a 
whole. 
The role of social movements in sociotechnical transitions may be considered in more detail in this regard 
(252,254). Discussions of the German energy transition – including those lying broadly in the field of 
sociotechnical regime studies, technological innovation systems theory and the multi-level perspective – are of 
course necessarily typically attentive to the role played by the large national anti-nuclear movement 
(97,255,256). But a key point here is that – for all that they are acknowledged from time to time – social 
movements nonetheless remain external to the core ontology of mainstream transition theory that centres 
around a focal regime (or ‘system’) ’and its immediate challenger niches under a general undifferentiated 
‘landscape’.  
Conversely, the opposite point must also be addressed, as to whether social movement activity in itself and 
alone is sufficient to explain the observed difference between Germany and UK? Certainly our research confirms 
a point noted by others, including in sociotechnical transitions approaches (96) to the effect that Germany’s 
anti-nuclear movement was larger than that in the UK and played a key role in influencing the transition (213). 
Yet it must also be acknowledged that the picture is not so simple when attention also extends to other countries 
including France (221) and Spain (257). These also experienced equally large – and sometimes violent – anti-
nuclear mobilisations at different times. Yet these were not as successful as in Germany in halting development 
of new nuclear build. So the point appears to remain valid, that patterns under this criterion are clearly relevant, 
but evidently insufficient in themselves. 
Likewise, the long-time presence of the Green Party in German politics, also acknowledged here as relevant,  
might be raised as being perhaps of sufficient importance in its own right (13,258). But here a similar caveat 
must also be made, in that other cases can be found where the same factor is present but with different results. 
Finland, for instance, provides an interesting counter-case where prominent participation by the Green Party in 
political life – including service in government (259) – have left unaffected the status of Finland as one of the 
few countries in Europe that is still constructing new nuclear power (260). In any case, the prominence of a 
counter-incumbency party like the Greens cannot easily in any setting, be entirely divorced from the wider issues 
discussed here concerning ‘qualities of democracy’. 
 
Also in relation to the criterion concerning broad political cultures, the picture identified here does chime with 
other analyses finding the UK to be distinctive in privileged access by private interests to the inner workings of 
the nation state (261–263). In this sense, the nuclear case constitutes just one example of close alliances 
between policy makers and significant lobby groups (16,261,264–266). And this is also a point that has been 
made by some sociotechnical transitions researchers in seeking to explain counter intuitive developments 
around UK energy policy (267). But again, this aspect seems unsatisfactory on its own as an answer to the key 
question as to why nuclear lobbying should so disproportionately be successful in the UK when the national 
industry is so relatively weak compared to that of other countries? It is this that has led expert commentators 
to ask “what is the British nuclear lobby”(268) ? Again, the dynamics in play seem broader than can simply be 




General qualities of democracy therefore evidently have a distinctive salience with regard to the different 
directions taken in nuclear policy by Germany and the UK. Here, the post-Fukushima decision in Germany can 
be seen as part of a longer process of the discontinuation of nuclear including the Nuclear Phase Out Law 
adopted in 2002 after negotiation between the Social Democratic-Green coalition government and industry 
(269). Despite a brief episode noted here – swiftly reversed from – in which high-level UK policy appraisal in 
2003 markedly favoured a non-nuclear future, the UK never adopted such an official law nor had official targets 
around nuclear phase out. For many years the UK has had a substantially worse-performing nuclear industry and 
a more abundant and cost-effective renewables resource than Germany. As time has passed, the technological 
and economic case for nuclear has significantly weakened by comparison with renewables. This intensifies 
questions over why it should be the country with ostensibly less substantive grounds for nuclear discontinuity, 
that made the first move, whilst the country with greater substantive grounds for a transition should remain 
wedded to the opposite strategy. Whether directly around the nuclear energy industry itself or its wider 
associations with military nuclear infrastructures, It is difficult to avoid concluding that the influence of some 
kind of persistent incumbency is a factor here (270). And to the extent that abilities to resist incumbencies lie in 
multiple forms of democratic struggle, it is similarly difficult to avoid concluding that differences in the respective 
qualities of democracy across the two countries are also highly salient.   
 
It is for all these reasons, that the findings identified here might be held on balance to address an issue of 
neglected significance in the field of sociotechnical transitions. Although addressed sporadically in particular 
areas of regime theory from time-to-time, recognition for the broad importance of general ‘qualities of 
democracy’ remains generally very marginal. The issues raised in this regard extend beyond the particular 
quantitative rankings discussed under the specific parameters examined here, which can only ever offer a highly 
incomplete and ambiguous picture of a concept as complex and contested as democracy (271–277). In this 
broader sense, ‘qualities of democracy’ also implicates all the other ‘external’ criteria discussed above 
(78,233,234,240,278). But what is especially compelling under this criterion, is that the overall picture remains 
so constant, despite the detailed contrasts in the characterising of what might constitute the particular qualities 
of democracy in question.  
  
Here there is a final resonance with one strand of recent analysis in broad transition theory. Jhagroe & Loorbach 
(75) defend regime theory against accusations that it is insufficiently attentive to democracy, but nonetheless 
acknowledge the need for further research in this area. Likewise, Hess & Mai (279) associate democracy with 
‘landscape’ processes and argue for further investigation of ‘varieties’ of factors that determine political 
capacities to enact sustainable transitions going beyond the focus on ‘regime’. Here, they explicitly identify 
democracy as a key factor which correlates with greater levels of commitment towards policies designed to 
promote renewable energy. The work of the present authors has further explored particular theoretical (48) and 
empirical (280,281) implications. Other recent research has pointed towards the need to understand the wider 
implications of democratic engagement beyond the usual locations in which participation in energy is usually 
considered taking a systemic perspective on democratic engagement (282,283). It is perhaps with these 
developments, that the present analysis chimes most strongly.  
 
It is in a related vein, that one final issue can be raised with a bearing on the issue of democracy. This concerns 
the issue considered here, as to whether developments in the civil nuclear field (at least in the UK) are being 
driven at least in part by concealed military interests. The findings under this criterion are that the observed 
comparison between the two countries, is at least consistent with the otherwise difficult to explain pattern of 
German nuclear discontinuation and British nuclear renaissance. This raises very particular and important 
implications that are also largely neglected in transitions studies in this sector. Indeed, so important are these, 
that they are the subject of a separate analysis by the present authors (209)(48). But for present purposes, it 
suffices to observe that – to the extent that the presence of military interests may exercise a concealed influence 
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on the direction of energy policy – this would in any event be a further instance of the importance of considering 





This paper has assessed the background to key recent developments in the challenging and assertion of nuclear 
incumbency in two countries where these current dynamics are arguably most strikingly contrasting: the UK and 
Germany. It has done this by means of nine criteria comprising twenty-nine parameters designed on the basis 
of various literatures to explore key relevant aspects bearing on nuclear incumbency and challenge in these two 
countries. Despite the complexities, the analysis found a relatively clear picture. On the basis of five criteria 
concerning dynamics that are most strongly highlighted in mainstream analysis of sociotechnical transitions, it 
is most reasonably be predicted that Germany would be significantly less likely than the UK to discontinue 
nuclear power. Yet this is the complete opposite of the observed situation, with Germany hosting a remarkable 
challenge to nuclear incumbency and the UK experiencing a retrenchment. It is the four criteria that address 
aspects operating beyond the usual focus of sociotechnical transitions theory (concerning a focal regime/niche 
configuration articulating incumbents and challengers), that are most in alignment with the observed pattern of 
developments. It is only in terms of these aspects largely outside ‘conventional’ regime theory, that it is possible 
to understand the UK’s renewed enthusiasm for nuclear in comparison to Germany’s currently ongoing nuclear 
phase-out. 
 
With analysis focusing on observable policy conditions and dynamics to date, this argument does not rely on 
assumptions that similar patterns will necessarily continue into the future. And, although caution is required in 
generalising to other cases beyond the particular industry or national settings focused on here, the refutation 
of theoretical predictions in only one case, is sufficient basis at least to question theory. So it is significant that 
the picture illuminated here does not seem satisfactorily explained by reference to any individual criterion – 
such as public opinion, social movements, concealed military interests or individual progressive political parties. 
What is relevant instead, are a range of issues that might broadly be characterised as the ‘qualities of 
democracy’. It is on this basis that it is argued that it is crucial to the understanding of sociotechnical 
discontinuity in this case, that attention be paid to the importance of broader issues than are typically currently 
attended to in this field, concerning general governance institutions, political discourse and representational 
processes and practices rather than specific industries, endowments or policy mixes.  
 
This is important, because – despite exceptions – general questions of democracy tend to be somewhat side-
lined in mainstream academic analysis in this field using frameworks like those developed in transitions 
management and the multi-level perspective. And there also arise from this analysis some potentially important 
practical political implications. If attention fixates unduly narrowly on potential roles for particular interventions 
addressing conditions within a specific regime and its contiguous sources of challenge, then this analysis suggests 
it may lead to an unfortunate neglect for the general importance of wider qualities of democracy in 
disembedding entrenched interests like those around sociotechnical incumbency  (48).  
 
In particular, there may result from this prevalent kind of research an overly concentrated emphasis on relatively 
specific managerial measures like sectoral missions, targeted instruments, regulatory reforms, operating 
standards, fiscal adjustments, higher education provision, training capacity, research strategies, protective 
niches and so on. Without detracting from the potential importance of these kinds of instrumental intervention 
in many settings, the present analysis underscores a serious question over their sufficiency. What may often be 
required as well – or even more – than such circumscribed technical policy functions, are entirely more radical 
and transformative capacities for general political mobilisation and critical challenge (231). Without these 
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